From November 28 to December 1, 1943, an international conference (code name “Eureka”) was held in the Iranian capital, Tehran.
The leaders of the 3 great allied powers – the USSR, the USA and Great Britain – met there. And this was their first meeting during the years of World War II.
Many articles, essays, and books were written about this conference. The famous film “Tehran-43” was shot. There are memoirs of Soviet intelligence officers...
"Big Three"
The main participants of the Tehran meeting were:
- Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin,
- Franklin Roosevelt
- Winston Churchill.
At that moment, all three were at the head of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The world, then tormented by an unprecedented war, closely followed their every step, listened to their every word.
And naturally, the eyes of all mankind were riveted on the Tehran Conference.
At the same time, not only the peoples of enslaved Europe were waiting for the decisions of the first meeting of the Big Three.
The Axis powers (Germany, Italy, Japan) were also anxiously awaiting the results of the conference.
And at that time, the fate of civilization and the lives of future generations largely depended on the ability of the 3 leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition to act together...
I must say that it is difficult to find people more dissimilar than them.
Each of these 3 leaders had their own views on history and the future of humanity.
Each of them had their own ideals and beliefs.
But, despite all this, the logic of the struggle against a common enemy brought them together in Tehran.
And they made agreed decisions there...
Many historians consider Tehran to be the zenith of the anti-Hitler coalition.
But the path to it was, oh, so difficult.
After all, the ruling circles of England and the United States have shown restraint since Hitler’s attack on the USSR. And at first they were very reluctant to enter into military cooperation with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet government sought to establish allied relations with the Western powers as quickly as possible, seeing this as the key to a successful struggle against the fascist Axis powers.
But London and Washington only under pressure from circumstances were involved in joint actions against a common enemy. And they delayed in every possible way in fulfilling their obligations.
It is clear that in the midst of the war, the leading figures of England and the United States did not dare to openly express their innermost aspirations.
Because at that time, in their own countries, public opinion was most decisively in favor of active cooperation with the Soviet Union. And the governments of England and the USA could not help but take into account the broad movement of the British and American people for an effective military alliance with the USSR, for decisive joint actions against a common enemy.
Correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill about the possibility of a meeting continued for a long time.
All three recognized the need and importance of meeting in person.
By that time, that is, by the autumn of 1943, in the course of the war against Nazi Germany there had been a clear turn in favor of the allies.
Therefore, not only military, but also political considerations dictated the urgent need for a meeting of the 3 leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition.
It was necessary to discuss and agree on further joint actions to speed up victory over the common enemy, and exchange views on the post-war system...
Choosing a meeting place
Back in the fall of 1943, when preparations were underway for the Moscow meeting of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, England and the United States, the issue of a possible meeting of heads of government was discussed in correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill.
In principle, an agreement was reached to hold such a meeting between November 15 and December 15, 1943.
But the meeting place where the conference was to take place caused serious controversy.
Stalin suggested Astrakhan or Arkhangelsk.
Roosevelt believed that Alaska was the best place.
There were options for Cairo and Baghdad.
Stalin preferred to hold the conference closer to Soviet territory.
He referred to the fact that “active military operations on the Soviet-German front do not allow him, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, to be away from Moscow for a long time.”
This was, of course, a compelling argument.
Roosevelt, in turn, referred to the American Constitution, which did not allow him, as president, to be absent from Washington for a long time.
In a message addressed to Stalin dated September 6, 1943, Roosevelt stated that “he could go to a meeting as far away as North Africa.”
Churchill, in turn, wrote that he would prefer to meet in Cyprus or Khartoum.
However, on September 8, Stalin proposed Iran as the most suitable meeting place for the Big Three.
Joseph Vissarionovich suggested meeting in Tehran.
Why Tehran?
A) He suited Stalin not only with the relative proximity to the USSR, the presence of Soviet troops, but also with the presence of wire telegraph and telephone communications with Moscow.
B) In addition, there were 3 embassies in Tehran: Soviet, British and American, which is also necessary for the summit.
C) An important factor in the choice of the Iranian capital was the fact that the country was under the control of Soviet, British and partially American combat units.
D) And the intelligence services of the three countries sufficiently “cleansed” Iran of enemy agents and had great opportunities to prevent terrorist acts against the three allies.
According to researchers, before agreeing on the meeting place and agenda, the parties exchanged 32 messages.
In a letter to Roosevelt on November 5, Stalin warned that otherwise he would refuse to participate in the conference and send Molotov in his place.
The leaders of the Western world had to agree with the arguments of the leader of the USSR.
Two days later, Churchill replied that he was “ready to go to Tehran.”
Meanwhile, Roosevelt, apparently guided primarily by considerations of prestige, continued to insist on another meeting point, offering various options.
Stalin further explained that as a result of the successful operations of the Soviet troops in the summer and autumn of 1943, it became clear that they could continue offensive operations against the German army, and the summer campaign could develop into a winter one.
Stalin continued:
“All my colleagues believe that these operations require the day-to-day leadership of the Main Headquarters and my personal connection with the command. In Tehran, these conditions can be ensured by the presence of wire telegraph and telephone communications with Moscow, which cannot be said about other places. That is why my colleagues insist on Tehran as the meeting place.”
Thus, a situation arose in which Roosevelt’s further refusal to come to Tehran could lead to Stalin not taking part in the planned meeting at all.
Seeing this and not wanting to miss the opportunity of personal contact with the head of the Soviet government, Roosevelt eventually changed his point of view.
And in a message dated November 8, he told Stalin that he had decided to go to Tehran.
Personal interests of allies.
The Tehran Conference was supposed to outline ways to achieve the goals of all parties involved.
Thus, the United States wanted to receive a guarantee that the Soviet army would enter the war against Japan after the victory over Germany. In this case, they would be able to greatly reduce their losses and costs.
Britain made plans to continue isolating the USSR and hoped that German military forces would continue to be drawn to the eastern front, and also that waging a difficult war would weaken the potential for the emergence of a "Red Menace" in Western Europe.
In the event of the opening of a second front, it was important for Britain to negotiate the most favorable terms.
Well, the Soviet Union, being fed up with the long-term promises of the allies, wanted to achieve a specific deadline for the opening of a second front. And to secure their consent for the future to strengthen the sphere of influence in Europe, when the Soviet Army enters there as a liberator.
Preparation of the conference.
Preparations for the conference were carried out in the strictest secrecy.
In Moscow, only a few of Stalin's most senior associates knew about the Big Three meeting.
The narrowest circle of politicians was informed in Washington and London.
Only on November 22, 1943, six days before the summit meeting, the USSR Chargé d'Affaires in Iran M.A. Maksimov notified Iranian Prime Minister A. Soheili about it.
The conference participating countries began to actively prepare for the upcoming summit.
Especially the intelligence services of the USSR.
There was a special security regime in Tehran.
In October, a regiment of NKVD border troops was moved to Tehran and began patrolling and guarding facilities related to the conference.
On the territory of the Soviet Embassy, which was an impregnable fortress, 200 Red Army submachine gunners served.
Judging by the documents, Stalin was guarded in Tehran by a total of more than 500 people.
For example, the seven-kilometer route from the airfield to the embassy, along which Stalin’s motorcade was supposed to follow, was guarded by an NKVD regiment and security officers in civilian clothes. Reserve military groups of machine gunners in covered trucks were stationed in the surrounding alleys.
Throughout the conference, Tehran was completely cut off from air traffic, telegraph, road and railway communications.
Broadcasting of Tehran radio was completely stopped.
The activities of all media were suspended.
The city was completely blocked by troops and special services.
And the Iranian border was closed.
In fact, the entire country was cut off from the rest of the world.
Arrival of delegations in Tehran.
In late November, delegations from 3 countries arrived in Tehran.
How and by what routes did the leaders of the USSR, England and the USA get to Tehran?
The roads that led the Allies from Moscow, Washington and London to Tehran were full of difficulties and dangers.
Joseph Stalin left Moscow for a conference on the evening of November 22, 1943.
Together with Vyacheslav Molotov and Klim Voroshilov, he departed on a special train from Moscow to Baku.
Letter train No. 501 ran along the route Moscow - Stalingrad - Baku.
Stalin was located in a separate armored carriage, weighing more than 80 tons, specially made for this trip.
Beria, senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff, also traveled in a separate carriage.
The entire journey of 2,500 kilometers was checked tens, hundreds of times, meter by meter, by the NKVD services.
Along the railway route and especially at the stops and stations, thousands of NKVD officers carried out security service.
There were some “adventures” along the route.
On one section of the route, the train almost came under attack by German bombers.
There were also technical problems. As follows from the reports, this happened “due to the release of faulty locomotives, melting of bearings, burning of axle boxes, detection of burst rails...”. The train crew could barely keep up with the schedule.
On November 26, the special train arrived at the small station of Kilazi, 85 kilometers from Baku.
Next - to the airfield.
There, 2 Douglas C-47 aircraft were waiting for the delegation led by Stalin. They spent the spring and summer of 1943 re-equipping and preparing for this special mission. At the helm of the first plane was the commander of long-range aviation, Marshal Alexander Golovanov, and the second was Stalin's personal pilot, Colonel Valentin Grachev.
After three hours of flight, the planes landed safely in Tehran.
It should be noted here that Stalin refrained from flying before Tehran.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the “leader of all nations” left the country for the first time since 1913...
Churchill set out on the voyage from Plymouth on the ship Rynaun, which dropped anchor in Alexandria on the morning of November 21st.
The most difficult route to the capital of Iran was for US President Roosevelt.
He had to cross the Atlantic in 7 days on the battleship Iowa, escorted by destroyers.
On the morning of November 20, he moored at the Algerian port of Oran.
On November 22, Roosevelt's plane landed at the Cairo airfield of the British Air Force.
Churchill was expecting the president there to agree on a joint position in future negotiations.
Bilateral Anglo-American negotiations took place in Cairo, at which a “synchronization of watches” was held before the meeting with Stalin in Tehran.
On November 27, Roosevelt arrived at the Cairo airfield.
At 7 o'clock in the morning, the presidential plane "Sacred Cow" took off and, after an almost seven-hour non-stop flight, landed at the Tehran airfield.
The American security service ensured the strictest secrecy - almost no one met the president, and there was no guard of honor.
Without an escort of armored vehicles, Roosevelt proceeded to the US mission in Iran, becoming the guest of the American envoy Louis Dreyfus.
Churchill headed from Cairo to Tehran also at dawn on November 27, but on his own route.
In Tehran he was greeted with more fanfare and less security.
Churchill noted in his memoirs:
“I was not happy with the way the meeting was organized upon my arrival on the plane to Tehran. The British envoy met me in his car, and we set off from the airfield to our diplomatic mission. Along our route into the city, for almost 3 miles, Persian mounted patrols were stationed every 50 yards. Thus, each attacker could know which important person was coming and which route she would take. There was no protection in case there were two or three determined people armed with pistols or a bomb.
American security has done a smarter job of protecting the president. The presidential car proceeded accompanied by a reinforced escort of armored vehicles. At the same time, the president’s plane landed in an unknown place and the president went without any security to the American mission through the streets and alleys, where no one was waiting for him.”
Based on the difficult internal political situation in Iran, Stalin invited Roosevelt to settle on the territory of the Soviet embassy.
The US President agreed.
Churchill:
“Thus, we all found ourselves within the same circle and could calmly, without interference, discuss the problems of the world war. I was very comfortable at the British legation, and I only had to walk a few hundred yards to the Soviet embassy building, which for a time became, one might say, the center of the whole world.”
Why did Roosevelt stop at the Soviet embassy?
There are several answers to this question and each is quite convincing in its own way.
Firstly.
The embassies of Britain and the USSR were located very close to each other. So, during the meetings, the embassy fences were dismantled and a corridor fenced with shields was created so that those passing by would not be visible.
And the US Embassy was located far on the outskirts of the city. And the daily journey back and forth through the narrow streets of Tehran, which (as Soviet intelligence knew) was literally swarming with German spies, would put the lives of the president and members of the delegation at risk.
Secondly.
Soviet intelligence was well aware of the impending assassination attempt on the heads of the Big Three by the German intelligence services.
And it would be much easier to ensure security in one area, without being scattered along the roads and outskirts of the city.
Upon returning from the conference to Washington, US President Roosevelt, speaking to reporters, said that Stalin invited him to stay at the Soviet embassy for security purposes, since he, Stalin, became aware of the impending conspiracy and possible assassination attempt. Thus, the threat from German agents allowed the leaders of the two powers, living under what is called “one roof,” to hold a number of confidential meetings and negotiations.
Perhaps this is what predetermined both the fate of the specific Tehran conference and the fate of the world in the future.
For Churchill, the fact that Roosevelt was located in the building of the Soviet Embassy was a complete surprise. After all, he himself offered the US President to live in the British Embassy, but Roosevelt refused. And at the same time he referred to the fact that he would feel better on his own territory. And here, on you...
“This is the victory of Uncle Joe (as Churchill called Stalin),” he repeated with annoyance. “Oh, it’s not for nothing that he dared him in his place, something is wrong here.”
Vladlen Dorofeev in the book “Stalinism: People’s Democracy” wrote:
“Be that as it may, Churchill felt that under the current circumstances he was losing the opportunity to somehow influence the American president in informal meetings.
As for Roosevelt, whose paralysis of both legs severely limited his freedom of movement, he was only glad to see a reduction in tedious travel and hassle with loading and unloading. Another great convenience was that his rooms were adjacent to the large hall where the plenary sessions of the conference were held.
Stalin, not without reason, believed that he had a good opportunity to get to know Roosevelt better both as a politician, as a person, and as a president.”
Without a doubt, the fact that Roosevelt was on the territory of the Soviet embassy gave Stalin the opportunity to daily influence him, developing a common opinion in opposition to Churchill’s well-known proposals to open a second front not in Northern France, which Stalin sought, but in the Balkans.
Subsequently, all meetings and sessions of conference participants took place on the territory of the Soviet embassy. With the exception of a gala dinner on November 30, 1943, held at the British Embassy, on the occasion of Winston Churchill's 69th birthday.
During his stay in Tehran, Stalin traveled outside the security zone only once. On November 30, Stalin, the only one of the Big Three, paid a visit to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi at the marble palace of Saadabad.
“This is my most important meeting,” the Shah admitted to his confidant Kh. Fardoust.
I would like to dwell on one more point.
Soviet intelligence installed hidden microphones in several rooms.
According to Sergo Beria, all of Roosevelt’s conversations “with Churchill took place there. They usually spoke to each other before the start of meetings or at the end of them. Naturally, some conversations took place between members of the delegations during rest hours. As for technology, it’s a regular recording, only tape recorders were, of course, larger at that time.”
Before the start of the conference, Stalin personally talked with Sergo Beria.
Sergo Lavrentievich Beria:
The task boiled down to “choosing from all the polyphony exactly what Stalin needed...”
Sergo Beria:
“The dialogues between Roosevelt and Churchill and the chiefs of staff were processed first. In the mornings, before the meetings began, I went to see Stalin. The main text that I reported to him was small in volume, only a few pages. This was exactly what interested him. The materials themselves were translated into Russian, but Stalin forced us to always have the English text at hand. For an hour and a half every day he worked only with us. This was a kind of preparation for the next meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill. In general, he prepared very carefully for any conversation. He had information on any issue discussed, and he knew the subject of conversation thoroughly...”
Ensuring the safety of Conference participants.
It must be said that information about the planned meeting of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt in Tehran became known to German army intelligence.
Historians believe that the “leak” came from the Abwehr undercover agent “Cicero” at the British embassy.
Based on this information, Admiral Canaris' headquarters developed a plan for Operation Long Jump.
It was aimed at eliminating the leaders of the Big Three.
This secret operation was developed and led by the famous fascist saboteur and terrorist SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny (since 1943, a special agent for special assignments and Hitler’s favorite).
His track record included:
- assassination of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss in 1934,
- arrest in 1938 of Austrian President Miklas and Chancellor Schuschnigg,
- in 1943, on Hitler’s personal order, he developed and carried out an operation to free the overthrown Mussolini, for which he was awarded the Knight’s Cross from the hands of the Fuhrer.
Luck always accompanied him.
But this time Soviet intelligence officers ruined his plans...
Soviet intelligence did not sleep.
One of the first messages about the Germans' plans came from intelligence officer Nikolai Kuznetsov.
Then messages came from other sources:
- from the Iranians,
- from the Germans,
- from “Amir” - Gevork Vartanyan (Soviet intelligence officer, Hero of the Soviet Union).
The German operation failed thanks to the successful work of our and British intelligence.
Amira's group tracked down the German resident Franz Mayer, who was hiding in Tehran.
Soviet intelligence, however, failed to capture it. Because literally under the nose of our capture group he was arrested by British intelligence, which was also hunting for him.
A walkie-talkie, codes, documents and the entire Abwehr archive were seized with him.
As a result of the interrogations, it became known that terrorist attacks were being prepared during the conference.
After his confession about plans to penetrate the Soviet Embassy through drainpipes, the British took control of the entire water supply and drainage system.
Vladimir Karpov in the book “Generalissimo” wrote:
“Embassy employee Andrei Myzdrikov... told me the details of the planned assassination attempt. He showed the exit from the well (kariz) through which the sniper was supposed to penetrate. German intelligence prepared a very real plan - a sniper through underground karizs penetrated into the very center of the embassy territory and appeared literally from underground a hundred meters from the stairs on which the heads of the three states were photographed. This photo is widely known.
I stood at the concrete hatch that now closes this exit, and thought that from such a distance not only a sniper, but anyone who knows how to shoot well would not miss and would have time to fire three shots before the guards realized where they were shooting from.
But, fortunately, our security officers quickly uncovered the Nazis’ plan, set up an ambush in the well and captured the entire group of terrorists.”
Another option was to plant explosives under the building of the Soviet Embassy.
To do this, the Germans wanted to bribe the priest of the only Orthodox church in Tehran, Father Mikhail. But, despite his hatred of Stalin and the Soviets, he refused and revealed the plans of the Nazis to the employees of the Soviet Embassy.
Three ambushes were also prepared along the route of Roosevelt’s possible passage from the US Embassy to the place of negotiations.
But since the president immediately accepted Stalin's invitation and went to the Soviet Embassy, the Germans were unable to take advantage of this plan.
Members of Gevork Andreevich Vartanyan’s group discovered a German landing party of six people, dropped near Tehran.
Having taken the saboteurs under surveillance, the scouts tracked them to the city and established their place of residence.
The group's radio transmissions with Berlin were located. And they managed to decipher them.
Thus it became known that the transfer of the second main group under the direct leadership of Otto Skorzeny was expected. This group was supposed to carry out the kidnapping or destruction of the leaders of the Big Three.
A group of German spies were arrested (including Otto Engelke, Mayer's chief assistant).
The radio operator agreed to work “under the hood” and the radio game with German intelligence began.
Despite the great temptation to detain Skorzeny himself, it was decided that the German radio operator would transmit a pre-arranged failure signal. And the Center in Berlin refused to expel the second group.
After all the failures, Skorzeny offered the Reich leadership a completely simple option - to rent a light plane, fill it to capacity with explosives and fly it to the Soviet Embassy.
But while the volunteer suicide bomber was being transported to the scene of events, the politicians had already gone home...
Who knows what path history would have taken if the assassination attempt on at least one of the leaders had been successful and the Germans had managed to disrupt the Tehran Conference...
Main issues discussed at the Tehran Conference.
The conference took place at a time when Soviet troops won a number of major victories over the Nazi invaders, clearing half of the occupied territory of the USSR from the enemy.
And the balance of power in the world has noticeably changed to the detriment of the fascist aggressors.
However, it was far from the complete defeat of Nazi Germany. She also possessed significant powers. Under its control were vast territories of the Soviet Union, Eastern and Western Europe.
Therefore, new and, most importantly, coordinated strikes by the allies from the east and west were necessary to completely crush the enemy.
In their first speeches at the conference, each of the leaders highly appreciated the very fact of its convening and the opportunities that opened up for its participants.
For example, according to Churchill, this conference was:
“The greatest concentration of world forces that has ever been seen in the history of mankind... I pray that we will be worthy of the wonderful opportunity God has given us to serve humanity.”
Stalin expressed a similar thought:
“I think history spoils us. She gave us very great strength and very great opportunities. “I hope that we will take all measures to ensure that at this meeting, in due measure, within the framework of cooperation, we use the power and authority that our peoples have entrusted to us.”
It is noteworthy that the conference agenda was not developed in advance.
Each delegation retained the right to raise any issues of interest to it.
Participants expressed their points of view not only at joint plenary sessions, but also during bilateral meetings, as well as conversations at protocol events.
The wide range of issues discussed at the conference can be divided into two categories: related to:
- to waging war and
- to the post-war world order.
The following issues were discussed at the conference:
1. The problem of the Second Front.
The main focus of the Tehran Conference was on military issues.
And, above all, the question of opening a “second front” in Europe.
Each side outlined its point of view on the scale, place and time of the landing of Anglo-American troops.
It must be said that the Allies deliberately delayed the start of hostilities in Europe.
They counted on the depletion of our forces. This would give them the opportunity to dictate their terms after the collapse of Hitler's Germany.
At the same time, the leaders of the US and British delegations understood: the 2nd front must be open so as not to end up losing. Since it was already obvious that Soviet troops were able alone, without the help of allies, to defeat the enemy and liberate all of Europe from the Nazi occupiers.
Roosevelt and Churchill differed only on where this front should be opened:
The 1st advocated a landing across the English Channel on the northern coast of France (“Overlord” plan),
2nd - from the Mediterranean Sea to the Balkans.
Churchill, like Roosevelt, did not want to allow Soviet troops to appear in Western Europe. But he did not expect to achieve this through a landing in Northern France, which would lead to a fight in the main strategic direction, where the Allies would face strong resistance from German troops.
Churchill envisioned closing the path for Soviet troops to the West by landing in the Balkans, where German resistance promised to be weaker and where Anglo-American troops were supposed to get ahead of the Red Army, strangle the democratic anti-fascist forces throughout South-Eastern Europe and create strong positions there for Western imperialism .
President Roosevelt subsequently told his son Elliot:
“Whenever the Prime Minister insisted on an invasion through the Balkans, it was perfectly clear to everyone present what he really wanted. “He, first of all, wants to drive a wedge into Central Europe in order to prevent the Red Army from entering Austria, Romania and even, if possible, Hungary.”
However, Churchill failed to replace the opening of a second front in France with an invasion of the Balkans.
Stalin, understanding Churchill's plan to cut off the Red Army's further path to Europe, confidently pursued the idea that the best result would be a strike against the enemy in Northern or Northwestern France with a simultaneous landing in the south of France, i.e. actually supported the Overlord plan.
Roosevelt and Churchill, agreeing with this point of view, did not abandon their military-strategic plans in the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe. They proposed expanding assistance to the Yugoslav partisans and involving Turkey in the war against Germany.
Stalin acknowledged the feasibility of these proposals, but noted that they should not delay Operation Overlord and that Turkey “will not enter the war, no matter how much pressure we put on it.”
The Soviet delegation pointed out that the gross violation by Britain and the United States of their obligations to open a second front not only in 1942, but also in 1943 led to a prolongation of the war and caused great damage to the general struggle against the fascist bloc.
Even before the Tehran Conference, the USSR insisted on establishing a firm deadline for the opening of the 2nd front in order to reduce losses and speed up the liberation of enslaved peoples from the fascist yoke.
But the nature of posing the question of opening a 2nd front has objectively changed compared to the initial period of the war.
Now victory over Nazi Germany was already a foregone conclusion and could be achieved by the forces of the Red Army alone.
In Tehran, the Soviet side stated that:
“As soon as the landing is carried out in Northern France, the Red Army, in turn, will go on the offensive. If it were known that the operation would take place in May or June, then the Russians could prepare not one, but several strikes against the enemy.”
The Soviet government wanted to know the exact date of the start of Operation Overlord, as the landing operation on the northern coast of France was conventionally called.
When Stalin said that it would be good for Allied troops to land in France “within May” 1944, Churchill initially objected:
“I cannot make such a commitment.”
He proposed that the issue of the timing of the start of the operation in France be submitted to a “military commission”, which he wanted to create specifically for this purpose.
Churchill's proposal was aimed at postponing the issue again.
However, this time he failed to achieve his goal.
Roosevelt supported the Soviet delegation, and Churchill was forced to give up his position. Roosevelt feared that if American and British troops did not land in France, then all of Western Europe would be liberated by the Red Army.
On November 30, 1943, at a conference in the presence of I.V. Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, General Brooke made a statement on behalf of the United States and England, in which he announced that Operation Overlord had begun:
“It will take place during May.
This operation will be supported by an operation against Southern France, the scale of which [the latter] operation will depend on the number of landing craft available at that time."
In response to this, J.V. Stalin at the same meeting made the following statement:
“In order to prevent the Germans from maneuvering their reserves and transferring any significant forces from the Eastern Front to the West, the Russians undertake to organize a large offensive against the Germans in several places by May, in order to pin down the German divisions on the Eastern Front and not give the Germans the opportunity create any difficulties for Overlord.
The governments of the United States and England also confirmed their commitments regarding the number of Anglo-American landing troops during the invasion of Western Europe, which was determined to be 1 million people.
At the insistence of the Soviet delegation, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to quickly resolve the issue of the commander-in-chief of this operation, so that the allies could begin its practical preparations as soon as possible.
The military decisions of the Tehran Conference stated that the conference:
“Took note that Operation Overlord will be undertaken during May 1944, together with the operation against Southern France.
This last operation will be undertaken on the scale that available landing craft will allow. The conference further took note of the statement of Marshal Stalin that Soviet troops would launch an offensive at about the same time in order to prevent the transfer of German forces from the eastern to the western front."
The decision to open a second front was reached despite Churchill's opposition and Roosevelt's hesitation. This was greatly facilitated by the firm position of the Soviet delegation.
The decision to open a second front was also influenced by US fears that the war in the Pacific would prolong itself.
As US Chief of Staff General Marshall stated at a meeting with President Roosevelt on November 19, 1943:
“The result of the operation in the Balkans will be the extension of the war, both in Europe and in the Pacific.”
Thus, after a heated discussion, it was decided to carry out an amphibious operation in northern France no later than May 1944.
The USSR took upon itself the obligation to coincide with this time a major offensive of the Red Army.
2. The German question.
The heads of 3 governments exchanged views on the future structure of Germany.
Roosevelt proposed dividing it into 5 states.
He declared:
“In my opinion, Prussia should be as weakened as possible and reduced in size. Prussia should constitute the first independent part of Germany.
The second part of Germany should include Hanover and the northwestern regions of Germany.
The third part is Saxony and the Leipzig region.
The fourth part is the Hessian province, Darmstadt, Kassel and the areas south of the Rhine, as well as the old cities of Westphalia.
The fifth part is Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg.
Each of these five parts will constitute an independent state. In addition, the areas of the Kiel Canal and Hamburg should be separated from Germany. These areas would have to be administered by the United Nations or the four powers. The Ruhr and Saar regions must be placed under the control of either the United Nations or the trustees of all Europe."
The British government also supported the dismemberment of Germany.
The English ruling circles hoped to bring Ruhr industry under their complete control.
Relying on the industrial power of the Ruhr, they intended to take a dominant position in Europe.
The British delegation supported the main provisions of the American plan.
For her part, she proposed, in order to weaken Germany, to isolate Prussia and tear away Bavaria and a number of other southern German states.
Churchill said:
“I have two thoughts. The first is the isolation of Prussia from the rest of Germany; the second is the separation of the southern provinces of Germany - Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, the Palatinate from Saarland to Saxony inclusive.”
He proposed creating a “Danube federation”, which was supposed to include all the southern provinces of Germany and the Danube countries of Central Europe.
The Soviet delegation believed that a solution to the German problem should be sought not through the destruction of the German state, but through its demilitarization and democratization, with the inevitable destruction of Hitlerism and the Hitlerite military machine.
The Soviet government understood that the main goal of the unifications planned by England in Europe was essentially the creation of anti-Soviet blocs.
Believing that after the end of the war the European peoples would strive to restore their independence, the Soviet government opposed such anti-democratic plans.
As for the British and American plans for Germany, Stalin directly stated that he “does not like the plan for new unifications of states.”
He emphasized that he did not see much difference between the population of Prussia and other parts of Germany.
G. Hopkins, who was present at the conference when proposals for the dismemberment of Germany were discussed, characterized the position of the USSR as follows:
“Stalin was not particularly enthusiastic about both proposals.”
The Soviet delegation proposed to transfer the issue of the dismemberment of Germany to the European Advisory Commission.
At the same time, the idea of the “four Ds” was approved:
1. Denazification. (A key principle that implied the complete liquidation of all Nazi organizations);
2. Demilitarization (disarmament of the German army);
3. Democratization (return of multi-party elections and all freedoms to the population);
4. Decartelization (dissolution of all large economic enterprises (cartels) that controlled the country's economy and did not provide opportunities for the development of medium and small enterprises).
As a result, the Allies did not achieve unity on the issue of the future of Germany.
3. Polish question.
The heads of the three powers exchanged views in Tehran on the issue of the borders of Poland.
The Soviet government always spoke out for the need to create an independent, democratic and strong Polish state as a result of the war.
For this and in order to strengthen peace in Europe, it was necessary to provide the Polish people with fair, historically justified borders, moreover, ones that would be for Poland the borders of peace with neighboring states.
It is known that throughout history the territory of Poland was redrawn more than once. The challenge, therefore, was to transform Poland's borders from a source of conflict and war into a factor of security and stability in Eastern Europe.
The Soviet government proposed to take the “Curzon Line” as the eastern border of Poland, which basically coincided with the ethnographic border of the Polish people, and the “River Line” as the western border. Oder".
In Tehran, the Soviet delegation, defending the interests of the Polish people, considered it necessary to return Poland to its ancestral lands in the west.
The head of the Soviet delegation confirmed that the USSR stands “for the restoration, for the strengthening of Poland.”
He emphasized that the Soviet Union is no less, but more than other powers, interested in good relations with Poland, since Poland is its neighbor.
The discussion of the Polish issue took place at the conference mainly during bilateral Soviet-British negotiations.
They decided to satisfy Warsaw’s territorial appetites at the expense of Germany, which occupied significant Polish lands back in the Middle Ages.
Stalin rejected the claims of Roosevelt and Churchill for Moscow's recognition of the Polish émigré government in London.
Moscow did not agree to this. And she stated that the USSR was separating Poland from the emigrant government in England.
As a result, the Stalinist version was adopted (the western borders are along the Oder and Western Neisse, and the eastern borders are along the Curzon line).
Thus, the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus was recognized as ceded to the USSR.
4. Japanese question.
The issue of war with Japan was also discussed in Tehran.
Throughout the war, this country pursued a policy that was sharply hostile to the USSR.
The Japanese government shamelessly violated the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of April 13, 1941, which provided for (Article 1) the maintenance of friendly relations.
In view of this violation by Japan of its obligations and in order to shorten the duration of the war in the Far East, the Soviet delegation met the repeated requests of the United States and England, who insisted on the USSR entering the war against Japan.
In order to further strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition and eliminate the hotbed of aggression in the Far East, J.V. Stalin declared that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan after the defeat of Nazi Germany.
As a result, the Soviet Union made a commitment, after the defeat of Germany, to join the Allies in the fight against Japan.
5. Iranian question.
The leaders of the 3 leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition adopted the “Declaration on Iran”.
The document noted that the heads of the USSR, USA and Great Britain:
"Recognize the assistance provided by Iran in waging war against a common enemy, especially by facilitating the transportation of goods from abroad to the Soviet Union... and recognize the 'specific economic difficulties' caused by the war."
The allies pledged to continue to provide economic assistance to Iran, including after the war. And they confirmed their desire to “preserve the complete independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.”
The declaration was greeted with great enthusiasm by the Iranian population and the ruling elite.
Tehran's Dey, Qaani and Raphael Avenues were renamed Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill streets.
6. Post-war cooperation.
In addition to military issues, the Tehran Conference also discussed issues of post-war cooperation and ensuring lasting peace.
At the Tehran Conference, a decision was generally agreed upon to transfer Koenigsberg (now Kaliningrad) and East Prussia (Kaliningrad region) to the USSR.
The Baltic states were also supposed to join the USSR, however, only after voting by the citizens of these countries.
American President Roosevelt for the first time voiced the need to create an organization that could ensure lasting peace after the war and would be based on the principles of mutual cooperation between different countries. He proposed creating an international organization (this issue had previously been discussed with Moscow) on the principles of the United Nations.
Stalin and Churchill generally supported this idea.
Thus, the work to create the UN began.
On December 1, 1943, the Declaration on joint actions in the war against Nazi Germany and on post-war cooperation was adopted.
Here is its text:
"We,
President of the United States,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
Prime Minister of the Soviet Union,
met for the last four days in the capital of our ally Iran and formulated and reaffirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our countries will work together both in times of war and in subsequent peacetime.
Regarding the war, representatives of our military headquarters participated in our round table negotiations, and we agreed on our plans for the destruction of the German armed forces.
We have come to full agreement regarding the scale and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.
The mutual understanding we have achieved here guarantees our victory.
As for peacetime, we are confident that the agreement that exists between us will ensure lasting peace.
We fully recognize the great responsibility resting on us and on all the United Nations to bring about a peace which will receive the approval of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the globe and which will eliminate the scourges and horrors of war for many generations.
Together with our diplomatic advisers, we looked at the challenges of the future.
We will seek the cooperation and active participation of all countries, large and small, whose peoples are committed in heart and mind, like our own people, to the task of eliminating tyranny, slavery, oppression and intolerance.
We will welcome them to join the peaceful family of democracies whenever they wish to do so.
No power in the world can stop us from destroying the German armies on land, their submarines at sea, and destroying their munitions factories from the air.
Our offensive will be merciless and increasing.
Having concluded our friendly conferences, we confidently look forward to the day when all the peoples of the world will live freely, free from tyranny, and in accordance with their various aspirations and their consciences.
We came here with hope and determination.
We are leaving here truly friends in spirit and purpose.
Roosevelt
Stalin
Churchill
Signed in Tehran on December 1, 1943."
Results of the Tehran Conference.
The decisions taken at the just ended Tehran Conference of the leaders of the three great powers demonstrated the unity of the allies, their determination to shorten the duration of the war and inflict a crushing defeat on the enemy.
The Tehran Declaration, which became known to the broad masses, inspired freedom-loving peoples to new exploits.
The results of the Tehran meeting were highly appreciated by freedom-loving humanity. And, above all, the peoples of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain.
Returning to Moscow, the head of the Soviet government received a telegram from the US President that said:
“I believe that the conference was very successful, and I am confident that. it is a historical event, confirming not only our ability to wage war together, but also to work for the cause of the coming peace in complete harmony."
“I agree with you that the Tehran conference was a great success and that our personal meetings were very important in many respects. I hope that the common enemy of our peoples, Hitler’s Germany, will soon feel this. Now there is confidence that our peoples will act together in harmony both now and after the end of this war.”
As for Churchill, he spoke more reservedly about the Tehran meeting, although in general he gave it a positive assessment.
“I was very encouraged by the feeling of our good relations that I brought with me from Tehran.”
Churchill's reticence had its reasons. After all, on many issues discussed in Tehran, he found himself in the minority. And, retreating step by step, he was forced to reluctantly join a number of important agreements reached by the Soviet Union and the United States.
At the Tehran Conference, the leaders of the 3 allied powers demonstrated the ability and desire to successfully, despite the presence of significant, sometimes deep differences, come to agreements on fundamental issues of war and peace.
The Tehran Conference strengthened the unity of the 3 powers by adopting an agreed decision on such an important issue as the opening of a second front in Western Europe.
It was also possible to set a specific date for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Normandy. Decisions were also made on many problems of the post-war system and cooperation in peaceful conditions.
No less important were the personal contacts between the top leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain.
At the same time, the first meeting of the heads of the 3 leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition revealed the difficulties and contradictions inevitably inherent in a military alliance, which included states with different social systems, with different worldviews and ideologies.
At the Tehran Conference, a proposal was made for the first time and the creation of an international organization - the United Nations - was discussed.
Separately, I would like to dwell on the role of Stalin at this conference.
Yuri Emelyanov wrote wonderfully about this in his book “Ten Stalin’s Blows”:
“Stalin’s merit was that he realistically assessed the position of the USSR in the world and behaved as befits the leader of the USSR at that historical moment...
...Stalin's carefully thought-out opinion, based on an accurate knowledge of varied and deep information, was highly valued and often became decisive for Churchill and Roosevelt. Realizing this, Stalin tried to take the place of an informal leader in this small team, often dictating his own terms. As the leader of the main belligerent power, Stalin came to the conference at the time and place where and when it was most convenient for him to be as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces. Churchill and Roosevelt accepted Stalin's demands for priorities in their 1944 military campaign, submitting to his demands to set the timing of Operation Overlord and the commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force.
On no issue did Stalin show such persistence as on the issue of the actual involvement of Allied troops in active combat operations against Germany. He berated Western leaders for their delay in carrying out the operation in Tunisia, as if they were Soviet generals subordinate to him. He did not spare harsh words and sarcasm, condemning yet another postponement of the second front. Despite the persistent desire of Western leaders to delay the opening of a second front, they were ultimately forced to yield to pressure from Stalin...
...Stalin was sometimes more harsh with Churchill, knowing full well that the latter often acts as a spokesman for the common Anglo-American position when Roosevelt preferred to remain silent (for example, on the issues of refusing to send northern convoys or relations with Poland). As the leader of the group, Stalin more than once gave real reprimands to Churchill, knowing full well that in this way he was making it clear to Roosevelt his attitude towards certain actions of the West. Then Churchill, as an experienced politician, was forced to indulge in emotional explanations, or Roosevelt suggested finding a way out in a compromise. At the same time, Stalin always knew where to stop and turn a heated argument into a joke...
...Stalin constantly demonstrated not only his compliance with the level of discussion, but also his superiority over his partners in knowledge of the subject. It is no coincidence that Stalin prepared so carefully for any international events within the framework of cooperation between the three great powers...”
And here is what Alexander Ushakov wrote in the book “Stalin. Beyond good and evil":
“To the surprise of his entourage, in Tehran he demonstrated flexibility that no one had ever seen before, turning Tehran into a kind of diplomatic Stalingrad.
He easily and, most importantly, almost accurately guessed the moves of his “friends,” while at the same time managing to hide his own trump cards. He did not fall into ostentatious hysterics, as Napoleon and the same Hitler did in their time, trying to suppress their opponents, but behaved like a hidden panther, ready to release its claws at any moment...
He listened attentively, answered briefly, but at the same time convincingly, and avoided all sorts of revelations, which Churchill, warmed up by Armenian cognac, was so eager to respond to... Moreover, it was in Tehran that Stalin showed himself to be a brilliant expert in a variety of fields of knowledge..."
And finally, a short excerpt from the memoirs of A. A. Gromyko:
“When the American president spoke, everyone present listened to him very carefully. They watched the progress and turns of his thoughts, his well-aimed judgments and jokes. Everyone was aware that he was expressing thoughts that were of great importance in the upcoming construction of the edifice of peace.
The Prime Minister of England spoke or made remarks. He skillfully and even deftly formulated his thoughts, and knew how to show off a joke. It was felt that he was on friendly terms not only with politics, but also with history, especially recent history.
Nevertheless, it somehow naturally turned out that everyone present - both the main and non-main participants - fixed their eyes on Stalin... And then quietly, as if by the way, Stalin began to speak. He spoke as if there were only two other people present besides him. There was not the slightest constraint, no desire to produce an effect, not a single roughness in the presentation of his thoughts. Every word he said sounded as if it had been specially prepared in order to say it in this audience and at this moment ... "
The significance of the Tehran Conference.
The significance of the Tehran Conference can hardly be overestimated, both for the course and results of the Second World War, and for the post-war period:
The Tehran Conference was a major step in strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition and in creating an atmosphere of trust between the leaders of the 3 great powers.
It dealt a strong blow to the calculations of the ruling fascist elite of Germany about the discord between the 3 great powers - the USSR, the USA and England, as soon as they began to discuss the problems of further waging the war and solving post-war problems of the world order.
The plans of fascist intelligence to organize terrorist attacks against the heads of allied delegations in order to disrupt the work of the Tehran Conference also failed.
The agreement of the heads of delegations of the 3 Allied powers that they would work together during war and in peacetime was very important.
And today, 75 years later, when the world order, developed as a result of three summits during the Second World War, is collapsing, when the split between countries, peoples, and faiths is deepening, when threats to peace and all humanity are increasing, the Tehran Conference once again convinces that in the name of achieving peace, universal security, humane, universal goals, it is possible to overcome the barriers of alienation in relations between powers that adhere to diverging ideological and spiritual values.
The conference of the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, held in Tehran on November 28 - December 1, 1943, is one of the largest diplomatic events of the Second World War. It became an important stage in the development of international and inter-allied relations of this period.
The Tehran Conference, during which a number of the most important issues of war and peace were considered and resolved, played a significant role in uniting the anti-Hitler coalition to achieve final victory in the war and in creating the foundation for the further development and strengthening of Soviet-Anglo-American relations.
The meeting in Tehran convincingly showed that, despite the fundamental difference in the political and social system of the USSR, on the one hand, and the USA and England, on the other, these countries could successfully cooperate in the fight against a common enemy, sought and found a mutually acceptable solution to the problems that arose between them controversial issues, although they often approached these issues from completely different positions.
The military and political cooperation of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain during the Second World War is one of the greatest lessons of history that cannot be forgotten.
The purpose of this work is to reflect the contradictions that arose at the Tehran Conference between its participants on key problems of international politics, and to determine the significance of the conference for the further conduct of war and the structure of peace.
The objectives are to reveal the positions of each party on the main issues and reflect the decisions made by the conference.
The Tehran Conference is the first meeting of the heads of three governments.
At the suggestion of the Soviet government, the conference took place in Tehran, from November 28 to December 1, 1943. The Tehran Conference is one of the largest diplomatic events of the Second World War. It became an important stage in the development of international and inter-allied relations of this period.
The meeting in Tehran, during which a number of the most important issues of war and peace were considered and resolved, played a significant role in uniting the anti-Hitler coalition to achieve final victory in the war and in creating the foundation for the further development and strengthening of Soviet-Anglo-American relations.
The Tehran Conference convincingly showed that, despite the fundamental difference in the political and social system of the USSR, on the one hand, and the USA and England, on the other, these countries could successfully cooperate in the fight against a common enemy, sought and found a mutually acceptable solution to disputes that arose between them issues, although they often approached these issues from completely different positions.
It was in Tehran that the exact date for the opening of a second front by the Allies in France was finally set and the British “Balkan strategy”, which led to a prolongation of the war and an increase in the number of its victims and disasters, was rejected. The decision taken by the conference to inflict a joint and final blow on Nazi Germany was fully consistent with the interests of all countries that were part of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The Tehran Conference outlined the contours of the post-war world order and achieved a unity of views on issues of ensuring international security and lasting peace. The meeting in Tehran had a positive impact on inter-allied relations and strengthened trust and mutual understanding between the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The Tehran conference of the leaders of the three allied powers took place in an atmosphere of outstanding victories of the Soviet armed forces, which led to the completion of a radical turning point in the course of not only the Great Patriotic War, but also the entire Second World War. The Nazis had already been expelled from Donbass and left-bank Ukraine. November 6, 1943 Kyiv was liberated. By the end of 1943 More than half of the territory of the USSR captured by the enemy was cleared. However, Nazi Germany remained a strong opponent. She still controlled the resources of almost all of Europe.
The results and consequences of the victories of the Soviet Army radically changed the military-political situation in the world, as well as the alignment and balance of forces in the international arena.
The scale of the military operations of the Western allies was, of course, incomparable with the military operations of the Soviet troops. Having landed in Italy after its surrender in September 1943, the Anglo-American troops were opposed by only 9-10 German divisions, while on the Soviet-German front 26 enemy divisions operated against the Soviet troops, of which 210 were German. And yet, by the end of 1943. the victory of the allied countries over the common enemy has come much closer, and relations between them have become stronger and stronger.
This was confirmed by the results of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA and Great Britain, as well as the achievement of an agreement on a meeting of the leaders of the three allied powers in Tehran.
After a radical military turning point in 1943, all the prerequisites were in place for convening a joint conference of the Big Three. F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill had long called on the Soviet leader to hold such a meeting. The heads of the USA and Great Britain understood that further successes of the Red Army would lead to a significant strengthening of the USSR's position on the world stage. The opening of a second front became not only an act of aid to the allies, but also a means to maintain the influence of the United States and Great Britain. The increased authority of the USSR allowed Stalin to insist in a more harsh manner on the agreement of the allies with his proposals.
On September 8, 1943, he agreed on the timing of the meeting with Churchill and Roosevelt. Stalin wanted the conference to be held in Tehran. He justified his choice by the fact that the city already had representative offices of leading powers. Back in August, the Soviet leadership sent representatives of state security agencies to Tehran, who were supposed to provide security at the conference. The Iranian capital was ideal for the Soviet leader. By leaving Moscow, he was thereby making a friendly gesture towards the Western allies, but at the same time he could return to the USSR at any time in a short time. In October, a regiment of NKVD border troops was moved to Tehran and began patrolling and guarding facilities related to the future conference.
Churchill approved Moscow's proposal. Roosevelt was at first against it, making the excuse of urgent matters, but in early November he also agreed to Tehran. Stalin constantly mentioned that he could not leave the Soviet Union for a long time due to military necessity, so the conference must be held quickly (November 27-30). Moreover, Stalin reserved the opportunity to leave the conference if the situation at the front worsened.
Positions of the Allied Powers before the Conference
For Stalin, from the very beginning of the war, the main issue remained the Allies' commitment to open a second front. Correspondence between Stalin and Churchill confirms that the British Prime Minister invariably responded to the constant requests of the head of the USSR with only vague promises. The Soviet Union suffered heavy losses. Lend-Lease supplies did not bring tangible help. The entry of the Allies into the war could significantly ease the position of the Red Army, distract some of the German troops and reduce losses. Stalin understood that after the defeat of Hitler, the Western powers would want to get their “share of the pie”, so they were obliged to provide real military assistance. Already in 1943, the Soviet government planned to take control of European territories up to Berlin.
The US positions were generally similar to the plans of the Soviet leadership. Roosevelt understood the significance of opening a second front (Operation Overlord). The successful landing in France allowed the United States to occupy the western German regions, as well as introduce its warships into German, Norwegian and Danish ports. The President also expected that the capture of Berlin would be carried out exclusively by the US Army.
Churchill had a negative attitude towards the possible increase in military influence of the USA and the USSR. He saw that Great Britain was gradually ceasing to play a leading role in world politics, giving way to two superpowers. The Soviet Union, which was gaining military momentum, could no longer be stopped. But Churchill could still limit US influence. He sought to downplay and focus on the actions of the British in Italy. A successful offensive in the Italian theater of operations allowed Great Britain to “penetrate” Central Europe, cutting off the Soviet troops’ path to the west. To this end, Churchill vigorously promoted the plan for landing Allied troops in the Balkans.
Organizational issues before the conference
On November 26, 1943, Stalin arrived in Tehran, followed by Churchill and Roosevelt the next day. Even on the eve of the conference, the Soviet leadership managed to make an important tactical move. The Soviet and British embassies were nearby, and the American one was at a considerable distance (about one and a half kilometers). This created problems in ensuring the safety of the American president during travel. Soviet intelligence received information about an impending assassination attempt on members of the Big Three. The preparation was led by the main German saboteur, O. Skorzeny.
Stalin warned the American leader about a possible assassination attempt. Roosevelt agreed to live at the Soviet embassy for the duration of the conference, which allowed Stalin to conduct bilateral negotiations without Churchill's participation. Roosevelt was pleased and felt completely safe.
Tehran Conference: date
The conference began its work on November 28 and officially closed on December 1, 1943. In this short period of time, several fruitful official and personal meetings took place between the heads of the allied states, as well as between the chiefs of the general staff. The allies agreed that all negotiations would not be made public, but this solemn promise was broken during the Cold War.
The Tehran conference took place in a rather unusual format. Its characteristic feature was the absence of an agenda. The meeting participants freely expressed their opinions and wishes, without following strict regulations. Read on for a brief summary of the 1943 Tehran Conference.
Question about the second front
The first meeting of the Tehran Conference of 1943 (you can learn about it briefly from the article) took place on November 28. Roosevelt announced a report on the actions of American troops in the Pacific Ocean. The next point of the meeting was a discussion of the planned Operation Overlord. Stalin outlined the position of the Soviet Union. In his opinion, the actions of the Allies in Italy are secondary and cannot have a serious impact on the overall course of the war. The main forces of the fascists are on the Eastern Front. Therefore, landing in Northern France becomes the first priority of the Allies. This operation will force the German command to withdraw some troops from the Eastern Front. In this case, Stalin promised to support the Allies with a new large-scale offensive by the Red Army.
Churchill was clearly opposed to Operation Overlord. Before the scheduled date for its implementation (May 1, 1944), he proposed to take Rome and carry out the landing of allied troops in Southern France and the Balkans (“from the soft underbelly of Europe”). The British Prime Minister said he was not confident that preparations for Operation Overlord would be completed by the scheduled date.
Thus, at the Tehran Conference, the date of which you already know, the main problem immediately emerged: disagreements among the allies on the issue of opening a second front.
The second day of the conference began with a meeting of the Allied chiefs of staff (generals A. Brooke, J. K. E. Voroshilov). Discussion of the problem of the second front took on a sharper character. The representative of the American General Staff, Marshall, said in his speech that Operation Overlord is regarded by the United States as a priority task. But the English General Brooke insisted on intensifying actions in Italy and evaded the question of the status of the Overlord.
Between the meeting of military representatives and the next meeting of the leaders of the allied states, a symbolic solemn ceremony took place: the transfer of an honorary sword to the residents of Stalingrad as a gift from King George VI. This ceremony defused the tense situation and reminded everyone present of the need for coordinated action towards a common goal.
At the second meeting, Stalin took a tough position. He directly asked the American President who was the commander of Operation Overlord. Having received no answer, Stalin realized that in fact the operation was still completely unprepared. Churchill again began to describe the advantages of military action in Italy. According to the memoirs of diplomat and translator V. M. Berezhkov, Stalin stood up abruptly and declared: “... we have nothing to do here. We have a lot to do at the front.” Roosevelt softened the conflict situation. He recognized the justice of Stalin's indignation and promised to negotiate with Churchill to make a decision that suited everyone.
On November 30, a regular meeting of military representatives took place. Great Britain and the USA approved a new start date for Overlord - June 1, 1944. Roosevelt immediately informed Stalin about this. At an official meeting, this decision was finally approved and enshrined in the “Declaration of the Three Powers.” The head of the Soviet state was completely satisfied. Foreign and Soviet observers emphasized that the solution to the issue of opening a second front was a diplomatic victory for Stalin and Roosevelt over Churchill. Ultimately, this decision had a decisive influence on the entire further course of the Second World War and the post-war structure.
Japanese question
The United States was extremely interested in the opening of military action by the USSR against Japan. Stalin understood that during a personal meeting, Roosevelt would definitely raise this issue. His decision will determine whether the United States will support the Operation Overlord plan. Already at the first meeting, Stalin confirmed his readiness to immediately begin military action against Japan after the unconditional surrender of Germany. Roosevelt expected more. He asked Stalin to provide intelligence data on Japan; he wanted to use Soviet Far Eastern airfields and ports to accommodate American bombers and warships. But Stalin rejected these proposals, limiting himself only to agreeing to declare war on Japan.
In any case, Roosevelt was satisfied with Stalin's decision. The promise of the Soviet leadership played a big role in bringing the USSR and the USA closer together during the war.
The leaders of the Allied states recognized that all Japanese-occupied territories should be returned to Korea and China.
Question about Turkey, Bulgaria and the Black Sea Straits
The question of Turkey's entry into the war against Germany worried Churchill most of all. The British Prime Minister hoped that this would divert attention from Operation Overlord and allow the British to increase their influence. The Americans took a neutral position, and Stalin was strongly against it. As a result, the conference's decisions regarding Turkey were vague. The issue was postponed until a meeting of allied representatives with Turkish President I. Inenu.
Great Britain and the USA were at war with Bulgaria. Stalin was in no hurry to declare war on Sofia. He hoped that during the occupation by the Germans, Bulgaria would turn to the USSR for help, which would allow Soviet troops to enter its territory without hindrance. At the same time, Stalin promised his allies that he would declare war on Bulgaria if it attacked Turkey.
An important place was occupied by the issue of the Tehran Conference on the status of the Black Sea straits. Churchill insisted that Turkey's neutral position in the war deprived it of the right to control the Bosporus and Dardanelles. In fact, the British Prime Minister feared the spread of Soviet influence into the area. At the conference, Stalin actually raised the issue of changing the regime of the straits and stated that the USSR, despite its enormous contribution to the general war, still had no exit from the Black Sea. The decision on this issue was postponed to the future.
Questions about Yugoslavia and Finland
The USSR supported the resistance movement in Yugoslavia. The Western powers were guided by the emigrant royal government of Mikhailovich. But the members of the Big Three were still able to find a common language. The Soviet leadership announced sending a military mission to I. Tito, and the British promised to provide a base in Cairo to ensure communication with this mission. Thus, the Allies recognized the Yugoslav resistance movement.
For Stalin, the question of Finland was of great importance. The Finnish government had already made attempts to make peace with the Soviet Union, but these proposals did not suit Stalin. The Finns offered to accept the 1939 border with minor concessions. The Soviet government insisted on recognition of the 1940 peace treaty, the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland, the complete demobilization of the Finnish army and compensation for the damage caused “at least in half.” Stalin also demanded the return of the port of Petsamo.
At the Tehran Conference of 1943, briefly discussed in the article, the Soviet leader softened the demands. In exchange for Petsamo, he refused the lease on the Hanko Peninsula. This was a serious concession. Churchill was confident that the Soviet government would maintain control over the peninsula, which was an ideal location for a Soviet military base, at any cost. Stalin's voluntary gesture made the proper impression: the allies declared that the USSR had every right to move the border with Finland to the west.
Question about the Baltics and Poland
On December 1, a personal meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt took place. The American president said that he does not object to the occupation of the territories of the Baltic republics by Soviet troops. But at the same time, Roosevelt noted that it was necessary to take into account the public opinion of the population of the Baltic republics. In a written response, Stalin sharply expressed his position: “... the question... is not subject to discussion, since the Baltic states are part of the USSR.” Churchill and Roosevelt could only admit their powerlessness in this situation.
There was little disagreement regarding the future borders and status of Poland. Even during the Moscow Conference, Stalin categorically refused to establish contacts with the Polish émigré government. The three leaders agreed that the future structure of Poland depended entirely on their decision. It's time for Poland to say goodbye to its pretensions to being a great country and become a small state.
After a joint discussion, the “Tehran Formula” of the British Prime Minister was adopted. The core of ethnographic Poland should be located between the Curzon line (1939) and the Oder River. Poland included East Prussia and the Oppel Province. This decision was based on Churchill's "three matches" proposal, which consisted in the fact that the borders of the USSR, Poland and Germany were simultaneously moved to the west.
Completely unexpected for Churchill and Roosevelt was Stalin’s demand for the transfer of Koenigsberg to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership had been nurturing these plans since the end of 1941, justifying them by the fact that “the Russians do not have anything in the Baltic Sea.” Churchill did not object, but hoped that in the future he would be able to defend Konigsberg for the Poles.
Question about France
Stalin openly expressed his negative attitude towards Vichy France. The existing government supported and acted as an ally of the Nazis, and therefore was obliged to suffer a well-deserved punishment. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership was ready to cooperate with the French National Liberation Committee. Charles de Gaulle offered Stalin very ambitious plans for joint governance of post-war Europe, but they did not find a response from the Soviet leader. The Allies did not generally consider France as a leading power with equal rights to them.
A special place at the conference was occupied by the discussion of French colonial possessions. The Allies agreed that France would have to give up its colonies. At the same time, the Soviet Union continued its struggle against colonialism in general. Roosevelt supported Stalin because Great Britain wanted to take possession of French Indochina.
The question of the post-war structure of Germany
For Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, the common idea was the mandatory dismemberment of Germany. This measure was supposed to stop any possible attempt to revive “Prussian militarism and Nazi tyranny.” Roosevelt planned to divide Germany into several independent small states. Churchill was more reticent because excessive fragmentation of Germany could create difficulties for the post-war economy. Stalin simply stated the need for dismemberment, but did not voice his plans.
As a result, at the Tehran Conference (1943) only the general principles of the post-war structure of Germany were approved. Practical measures were postponed for the future.
Other decisions of the Tehran Conference
One of the secondary issues was the discussion of the creation of an international organization that could maintain security throughout the world. The initiator of this issue was Roosevelt, who proposed his plan for creating such an organization. One of the points suggested the formation of a Police Committee (USSR, USA, Great Britain and China). Stalin did not object in principle, but pointed out that it was necessary to create two organizations (European and Far Eastern or European and world). Churchill shared the same opinion.
Another outcome of the Tehran Conference was the adoption of the “Declaration of the Three Great Powers on Iran.” It enshrined the recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Iran. The allies confirmed that Iran had provided invaluable assistance in the war and promised to provide economic assistance to the country.
Stalin’s skillful tactical step was his personal visit to the Iranian Shah R. Pahlavi. The head of Iran was confused and considered this visit a great honor for himself. Stalin promised to help Iran strengthen its military forces. Thus, the Soviet Union acquired a loyal and reliable ally.
Conference results
Even foreign observers noted that the Tehran Conference was a brilliant diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union. I. Stalin showed extraordinary diplomatic qualities to “push through” the necessary decisions. The main goal of the Soviet leader was achieved. The Allies agreed on the date for Operation Overlord.
At the conference, there was a convergence of the positions of the United States and the USSR on key issues. Churchill often found himself alone and was forced to agree with the proposals of Stalin and Roosevelt.
Stalin skillfully used the “carrot and stick” tactics. He softened his categorical statements (the fate of the Baltic republics, the transfer of Konigsberg, etc.) with some concessions to the Western powers. This allowed Stalin to achieve favorable decisions at the Tehran Conference regarding the post-war borders of the USSR. They played a huge role in history.
The result of the Tehran Conference was that for the first time general principles of the post-war world order were developed. Britain recognized that the leading role was shifting to the two superpowers. The United States increased its influence in Western and the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe. It became clear that after the war there would be a collapse of the former colonial empires, primarily Great Britain.
The essence
What is the essence of the Tehran Conference? It contained a huge ideological meaning. The conference held in 1943 confirmed that countries with different political systems and mutually exclusive ideologies were quite capable of agreeing on the most important issues. Close relations were established between the allies. Of particular importance was clearer coordination of combat operations and the provision of mutual assistance.
For millions of people around the world, the conference became a symbol of inevitable victory over the enemy. Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt set an example of how mutual differences can be easily overcome under the influence of a common mortal danger. Many historians consider the conference to be the zenith of the anti-Hitler coalition.
At the Tehran conference, which we briefly discussed in the article, the leaders of the Big Three came together for the first time. Successful cooperation continued in 1945 in Yalta and Potsdam. Two more conferences took place. The Potsdam, Tehran and Yalta conferences laid the foundations for the future structure of the world. As a result of the agreements, the UN was created, which, even during the Cold War, to some extent sought to maintain peace on the planet.
Tehran Conference*
Conference of the heads of government of the three allied powers - the USSR, USA and Great Britain - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, US President F.D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill, with the participation of diplomatic advisers and representatives of military headquarters, took place in Tehran from November 28 to December 1, 1943. The main issues at the conference were military issues, especially the question of a second front in Europe, which, contrary to the obligations of the United States and Great Britain, was not opened by them either in 1942 or 1943. In the new situation that arose as a result of the outstanding victories of the Red Army, the British -American allies began to fear that Soviet armed forces would liberate Western Europe without the participation of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain.
I.V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill at the conference in Tehran. 1943
However, during the negotiations, differences in the views of the heads of government of the United States and Great Britain about the place, scale and time of the Allied invasion of Europe were revealed. Roosevelt stated that he considered it necessary to carry out the decisions of the Conference of Heads of Government of the United States and Great Britain in Quebec (Canada, August 1943) on the invasion of Europe across the English Channel around May 1, 1944 (Plan Overlord). Churchill tried to replace the opening of a second front in France with operations in Italy and the Balkans, in order to ensure the occupation of Central and South-Eastern Europe by Anglo-American troops, and to transfer the question of the timing of the start of operations across the English Channel to “military specialists”.
The Soviet delegation noted that the most effective would be to strike the enemy in Northern or Northwestern France with a simultaneous landing in Southern France. As a result of the discussion on November 30, 1943, on behalf of the US and British delegations at the conference, it was announced that Operation Overlord was scheduled for May 1944 and would be carried out with the support of landings in the south of France. Stalin, in turn, was forced to promise that Soviet troops would launch an offensive at about the same time in order to prevent the transfer of German forces from the Eastern to the Western Front. The conference participants agreed on the need to take measures to involve Turkey in the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition and to provide assistance to the Yugoslav partisans.
The Soviet delegation, meeting the wishes of the governments of Great Britain and the United States, and also taking into account Japan's repeated violations of the 1941 Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and the assistance it provided to Nazi Germany, declared that the USSR would enter the war against Japan when the German army was completely defeated.
The conference also discussed issues of post-war peace and security of nations. The Soviet delegation emphasized the need to take effective measures against the revival of German militarism and revanchism. The US and British delegations put forward various plans for the post-war structure of Germany: a plan for the creation of 5 German states and the establishment of United Nations control over the Ruhr, Saarland and other areas of Germany (Roosevelt); a plan for the creation of a “Danube Federation” with the inclusion of all the southern provinces of Germany and the Danube countries of Europe (Churchill). These plans did not receive support from the Soviet delegation. At Stalin's suggestion, the issue was submitted for study to the European Advisory Commission. At the conference, a decision was agreed in principle to transfer Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) to the Soviet Union.
The heads of the three governments also considered the issue of Poland. A preliminary agreement was reached that its post-war borders should follow the Curzon Line in the east and the Oder River in the west. Roosevelt and Churchill expressed the hope that the USSR government would restore relations with the Polish émigré government in London, which the Western powers hoped to establish in Poland in order to preserve the bourgeois system there. The Soviet government did not agree to this and declared that it was separating Poland from the emigrant government in London.
The “Declaration of the Three Powers” adopted on December 1, 1943 by the conference participants spoke of their full agreement “... regarding the scale and timing of the operations that will be undertaken from the east, west and south.” Confidence was expressed that their agreement would ensure lasting peace between peoples.
The leaders of the three powers exchanged views on the creation of an international security organization after the war. They also adopted the “Declaration on Iran,” in which they confirmed their desire to preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of this country.
From the book 100 Great Intelligence Operations author Damaskin Igor AnatolievichTehran action We will talk here about the operations of two intelligence services - German and Soviet, operating in contact with the British. On the eve and in the first period of World War II, Hitler's Germany turned Iran into a springboard for hostile actions against the USSR and England.
From the book Lawyer Encyclopedia by the authorIntergovernmental conference INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE (Latin conierre - to gather in one place; French conference - meeting) - convened by mutual agreement of states or by decision of the relevant competent interstate (intergovernmental)
From the book Great Soviet Encyclopedia (SE) by the author TSB From the book Great Soviet Encyclopedia (BI) by the author TSB TSB From the book Great Soviet Encyclopedia (KA) by the author TSB TSB From the book Great Soviet Encyclopedia (KO) by the author TSB From the book Intelligence and Espionage author Damaskin Igor Anatolievich From the book Great Soviet Encyclopedia (RI) by the author TSB From the book Great Soviet Encyclopedia (CA) by the author TSB From the book Great Soviet Encyclopedia (SHE) by the author TSB From the book Great Soviet Encyclopedia (PYa) by the author TSBV. DYMARSKY: Good evening, dear listeners. Another program from the “Price of Victory” series live on Echo of Moscow. As always, its presenters are on point, Dmitry Zakharov...
D. ZAKHAROV: And Vitaly Dymarsky. Good evening.
V. DYMARSKY: Our guest today, I’ll introduce him right away, is Anatoly Utkin, director of the Center for International Studies at the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Anatoly Ivanovich, good evening.
A. Utkin: Good evening.
V. DYMARSKY: Anatoly Ivanovich is known among us as a great expert on Roosevelt, but today we will talk not only about Roosevelt, but in general about the big three leaders, this, in addition to Roosevelt, also Churchill and Stalin, who in late November - early December 1943 years gathered in Tehran for the famous Tehran Conference. I want to say right away that today Anatoly Ivanovich and I will talk mainly about the political and diplomatic significance of this conference, because we received questions even before the broadcast and many people are interested in this, this is understandable, this is also an exciting story related to this conference, this is an intelligence struggle, but perhaps we will devote a separate program to this, and today we will mainly talk about this political and diplomatic significance. So, the Tehran Conference. As a matter of fact, the allies - the USA, Great Britain, the Soviet Union - or rather, the leaders of these three countries came together for the first time in all the years of the war, gathered in Tehran. There was a whole story about the choice of location. Roosevelt, in my opinion, did not really want to go to Tehran.
A. Utkin: He wanted a little closer. Even Cyprus was suitable for him.
V. DYMARSKY: He proposed North Africa.
A. UTKIN: At the last moment, even the conference was in jeopardy because the president wanted Basra.
V. DYMARSKY: This is Iraq.
A. UTKIN: Today's Iraq, the British left recently.
V. DYMARSKY: He was not happy there, apparently because of such an operational connection with the United States.
A. UTKIN: It seems to me that the point was that... Let's start with the fact that in 1910 England and France divided Iran into two parts - northern and southern. And at the beginning of 1941, the British and Russians entered Iran, that is, northern Iran, including Tehran, was completely a zone of Russian influence. The president didn’t really like this; it was as if he was working on someone else’s territory.
V. DYMARSKY: Moreover, he worked doubly on foreign territory, because he was settled on the territory of the Soviet embassy.
A. Utkin: Of course. He only spent the first night at the American embassy, and then he agreed - after all, you know, the tsarist embassy was luxurious, it was closer to the center, it was closer to the British embassy, and besides, Stalin offered the central building to the American president, and he himself lived in a small neighboring building.
V. DYMARSKY: At the ambassador’s apartment, in my opinion.
D. ZAKHAROV: There is also, I think, an important aspect - the issue of security, because the Soviet embassy in Tehran, the former tsarist one, was essentially a citadel, and the number of people with guns from Stalin was significantly greater than Roosevelt could bring with him, that is, everyone seemed to understand perfectly well that there was a danger of an assassination attempt, and it was, to put it mildly, almost impossible to commit it on the territory of the Soviet embassy. The only thing that did not suit Roosevelt was that the frogs croaked very loudly under his window and disturbed his sleep.
V. DYMARSKY: There is a famous story when the translator - Zarubina, in my opinion - she could not remember the word “frog” in Russian.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, a small green animal. Well, in the end, the embassy security resolved the issue with the frogs radically. Roosevelt complained no more.
A. Utkin: Well, you know, this great man also had his own oddities. He loved the color blue, he didn't like the color green, he hated closed rooms.
V. DYMARSKY: Was there such claustrophobia?
A. Utkin: As a child, there was a fire, and he remembered when the doors were closed. He hated air conditioners, for example, and so on. There is a lot to be said here.
D. ZAKHAROV: Be that as it may, he settled in the Soviet embassy. English, as already said, was nearby. It was convenient to position ourselves. But, nevertheless, a significant part of the meetings, if my memory serves me correctly, took place on our territory.
A. UTKIN: This is the central room of the Soviet, Russian embassy, heavy dark carpets, large chairs and, of course, Stalin proposed Roosevelt as chairman of the conference, so all the meetings took place here.
V. DYMARSKY: The Tehran Conference entered the history of the Second World War, basically, in its content, as a conference, as a meeting at which, finally, the issue of opening a second front was finally settled, as if the main result, the main result of this Tehran meetings.
A. UTKIN: Only Stalin disagreed with this - that the issue had been resolved. Immediately after Roosevelt spoke exactly in your spirit, he asked “who will be commander in chief?”, and unfortunately, alas, Dwight Eisenhower had not yet been appointed, and then he said “well, then this is not a solution to the issue yet.”
D. ZAKHAROV: On the one hand, it seems yes, but, on the other hand, they still agreed that the landing is scheduled for May 1944.
A. UTKIN: Plus or minus a month back and forth, depending on events in Italy.
V. DYMARSKY: Ultimately, this happened on June 6, 1944 - the landing in Normandy, but there, on this issue of opening a second front, actually at the very end of the conference, Roosevelt and Stalin managed, and this pair, the duo, managed to change Churchill’s mood.
A. UTKIN: Absolutely, because Churchill, of course, thought and constantly talked about Yugoslavia, about the Balkans, about the fate of Italy, about the fact that it was possible to reach the Panoni Valley, that is, he tried to find alternatives to landing in northern France.
D. ZAKHAROV: That is, I didn’t really want the landing to take place from British territory.
V. DYMARSKY: How can we explain this? Here is one of the explanations that I saw is that Churchill insisted on military operations in the south of Europe, in particular, through the Apennines, that is, through Italy, and as many believe, he already saw far and wanted, as it were, from the south , a shorter route, to prevent the advance of Soviet troops across Europe.
A. UTKIN: I have to both agree and slightly disagree with you.
V. DYMARSKY: This is not my point of view, I am broadcasting it.
A. UTKIN: Well, consider it a turn of phrase. The fact is, now this is almost forgotten, now the American 6th Fleet dominates in the Mediterranean, and in those days the British Fleet dominated from Gibraltar to the Sea of Marmara, especially after four of the six Italian battleships were sunk, there was absolutely no already Austrian, in the First World War, and so on. In short, for Churchill the most important thing was Greece, the most important was Alexandria and Egypt.
V. DYMARSKY: Churchill also wanted to liberate Rome.
A. Utkin: Well, this was already a movement upward, towards Berlin. But still, the strength of Great Britain was in its fleet and this fleet was obliged to control the Mediterranean. If you remember what happened a year later, in October 1944, when Stalin and Churchill agreed, then, so to speak, Churchill asked for Greece for himself, ninety percent of influence in Greece, because it gave him...
V. DYMARSKY: This is the Balkans, in general, Great Britain has always been partial to the Balkans.
A. Utkin: Access to the Balkans, yes. But I still want to say that it seems to me that without this, we are starting to get a little vague about the actual reason for convening this conference. After all, it happened at the end of November 1943 for a reason. When the Soviet army crushed the Germans, or rather, did not let them through 15 lines of defense near Kursk and Orel, Stalin said the words that they often quote: “We will do it ourselves.” These words sounded the death knell for all plans for the unification of Western Europe, the metropolises, and so on. If Stalin thought that the Red Army could crush Germany and enter Europe entirely - “we will do it ourselves,” then this is scary, then we get a situation in which England is again a small boat. I think this is very significant.
V. DYMARSKY: This is essential for the position in the sense of the USA and Great Britain, but then why did Stalin still agree, in a reverse situation, to the second front? If we can do it ourselves, why are they needed then, translating into simple language?
A. Utkin: Imagine the country's losses by this time. After all, there was a situation when the Red Army retreated to Stalingrad. There were 110 million left. Half the population was occupied. Hitler still had 400 million there in Western Europe. It seemed that the Soviet Union had no chance. And then he appeared for the first time, such a glare, and Stalin was simply afraid. The losses would have been gigantic if the Red Army had marched to Berlin on its own path, without the help of the West, and so on.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, despite everything, as you said, Stalin said “we will do it ourselves,” but there is another very important point here, which, it seems to me, is always forgotten when it comes to the second front. The first attempt to land, as we remember, was in Dieppe, at the very beginning of the war.
A. Utkin: Very unfortunate.
D. ZAKHAROV: Very unsuccessful, very bloody, a relatively small contingent, several thousand people, landed.
A. UTKIN: Canadians, mostly.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, which the Germans captured with lightning speed and simply destroyed. It was a kind of call. After this, it became clear that it was absolutely pointless to land in small groups on the scale of a division, several divisions. The landing will only be effective when absolute superiority is achieved. In order for the landing to be exactly like this, it was necessary to accumulate gigantic human and military-technical resources, and it was unrealistic to do this even within a year. Bringing a million people across the ocean is a very difficult task. At one time, Hans von Luck, speaking about American troops, said: “Never underestimate the Americans. If you hit them today, they will sit down, think, and hit you a thousand times harder tomorrow.” And the Americans acted both then and subsequently in exactly this way, that is, if you are going to land in Europe, you need to have such an advantage over the German forces in France that they couldn’t even gasp, so it generally took quite a long time, and blaming the Allies for not landing in 1942, in 1943 - they simply did not want a repeat of Dieppe, that would be simply stupid.
A. UTKIN: You know, I allow myself to disagree with you, with all due respect. You know, Dieppe took place when Stalingrad, the Kursk Bulge, Operation Bagration and all those wonderful victories that crushed the main power did not yet exist. Let's not forget that out of ten Germans killed in World War II, eight were killed on the Soviet-German front, on the Eastern Front. And Dieppe was at a time when it was possible to transfer divisions, dozens of divisions. But the landing on June 6, 1944, took place when the Germans had, in general, several divisions, and they could not do anything.
D. ZAKHAROV: You know, at the time of the landing and at the time of Dieppe, the number of German forces on French territory was approximately the same. The fact is that after the occupation of France, they did not see the point of keeping significant forces there, except for the commandant, several infantry and the so-called “Atlantic Wall”, where, in general, there was also a small contingent. The build-up began after the landing. That is, it was a definite mistake on the part of the Germans, and the build-up was quite significant, because we remember that they began to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front and transfer them there.
A. UTKIN: Aviation especially.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. In this case, I spoke not about the capabilities of the Germans, but about the sensible approach of the Americans to this issue - you cannot do something that will lead to a certain defeat.
A. UTKIN: Well, we must remember what the allies did in the period between the promise made once again in Tehran and in Normandy itself. They captured Sicily, they landed in the south of the Italian “boot”, and they, in fact, with their pressure, overthrew Mussolini, forced Italy to capitulate, and Germany’s first ally on the European continent faded into oblivion. Another thing is that it was difficult to move up this “boot”, but the fact is that during this time very important events happened.
D. ZAKHAROV: As if it were a kind of rehearsal for “Overlord”. And for all that, as Steinhoff recalled in his diaries, what they did with Sicily is approximately the same as what they later did in Normandy and what they did, strictly speaking, on the territory of Germany, that is, they ironed Sicily, so that in some places it became similar to the surface of the Moon, was very seriously processed, although it would seem to be a small island and, moreover, an island where not the German population is located, but Italians, but it was as if there was a dress rehearsal and very serious.
V. DYMARSKY: Sorry, I must remind our listeners of the SMS number to which they can send their questions: +7 985 970-45-45. Anatoly Ivanovich, here came a question from Dmitry from Volgograd: “Did Roosevelt propose to Stalin to divide the world without the participation of England?” Were there any separate negotiations among this trio?
A. Utkin: No, this never happened.
V. DYMARSKY: Anglo-American solidarity was still higher.
A. Utkin: That’s not the point. As far as I understand the geopolitics of President Roosevelt, he would like England to watch Europe, and America to watch England, so that Russia would be watched by four hundred million China, and America would help weak China, and in this situation the United States would have the keys to the world States. This is my understanding. Well, there was no Chinese representative in Tehran at that time, but, in general, such a vision of the world existed. Two important geopolitical issues existed. First, Roosevelt was categorically against leaving zones of influence to the European metropolises, and second, he wanted China to be raised, its importance, and for China to become one of the four policemen in this world.
V. DYMARSKY: Well, we’ll talk about this later - the scheme of the future United Nations according to Roosevelt.
D. ZAKHAROV: And now we have to pause.
V. DYMARSKY: Yes, now a short news release, after which we will continue our conversation with Anatoly Utkin.
NEWS
V. DYMARSKY: Good evening again. We continue the “Price of Victory” program and today we are discussing the Tehran Conference of 1943. Anatoly Ivanovich, I’ll ask you a question right away, which came before the broadcast on the Internet. Moscow, Eldar, amateur photographer: “It is known that Stalin flew to Tehran by plane. Was it a non-stop flight? How did Roosevelt and Churchill get there? And what was the reaction of the German leadership to this conference and the decisions made at it? As far as I understand, this, in my opinion, was Stalin’s first air flight?
A. Utkin: Yes, Stalin did not like airplanes. But he flew to Berlin and Baku by plane. So, I answer the question. Stalin flew to Tehran by plane, but with one landing. He landed in Baku. And in Baku, the leaders of Soviet aviation approached him. These were the commander of aviation, Marshal Novikov, and the commander of heavy bomber aviation, Golovanov. They offered him a choice - I must say that there were 20 fighters circling in the sky - they offered Stalin two options. According to the first, Stalin flew together with Golovanov, Colonel General, to Tehran, and according to the second, the colonel, unknown to the world, was supposed to bring Stalin to Tehran on his plane. And Stalin then said the words that generals rarely fly and that’s why he sat down with the colonel.
V. DYMARSKY: But he traveled to Baku by train.
A. Utkin: He traveled to Baku by train.
V. DYMARSKY: And the way back was the same.
A. Utkin: And the way back is the same. And I must say that these carpets that surprised Churchill and Roosevelt were all, of course, from Moscow hotels - just as it would later be in Yalta and so on. How did Roosevelt and Churchill get there? What didn't Churchill want? Churchill did not want a bilateral, American-Soviet meeting. And therefore, when it was finally decided that Churchill would also be present, he rejoiced, he even wrote poetry. All in all. It was a flight to Cairo, because the Cairo Conference took place on the twentieth of November 1943. The Chinese were present there, unlike Tehran, Chiang Kai-Shek was there. And what everyone notes is that Chiang Kai-Shek behaved servilely. And, of course, Churchill and Roosevelt understood that Stalin did not like it when the Western allies agreed among themselves before meeting with him. This largely explains Churchill’s behavior during this meeting; he wanted to show that they had no a priori agreement. And what was the reaction of the German leadership - I don’t want to say too much on this topic, but at least one attempt was made to kill all three. A certain Schultz, whose last name was Belyaev and who was introduced into Germany in 1930, was an Abwehr major and a major in Soviet intelligence, and he noticed that he was in the zone of suspicion, and then he damaged the transmitter. Soviet fighters shot down a plane that was full of machine guns. These are just some touches to what...
V. DYMARSKY: Well, it seems like Skorzeny was...
A. Utkin: Skorzeny and Mussolini are a little different.
V. DYMARSKY: Another story, but here almost Skorzeny’s unit was tasked with removing the leaders, no?
A. Utkin: No, it seems to me that this is...
V. DYMARSKY: Speculations.
A. UTKIN: Well, I would like to say that the materials of the conference reached Hitler with lightning speed, literally on the second day, because the British ambassador in Ankara had a lackey named Cicero, they say he was Greek.
V. DYMARSKY: Cicero is a nickname.
A. Utkin: He took the keys from the fallen ambassador, opened the safe and read all the materials. These materials were sent to Berlin. Therefore, Hitler had a full understanding of what else awaited him in the event of defeat. I must say that the Germans did not act very well towards Cicero, at least in that they paid him in counterfeit pounds sterling, and when, after the end of the war, the poor fellow decided to retire and buy a house, he was captured and faced prison. There was a whole tragedy when Cicero turned to Germany, that I worked for your nation, for you, for Germany itself, for eternal Germany, and you repaid me with this.
D. ZAKHAROV: A very important point, it seems to me, which cannot be ignored. Well, the usual phrase is that at the Tehran Conference the foundations were laid for the redivision of the world in the post-war years. As far as I remember, Churchill insisted that Germany be divided into five parts.
V. DYMARSKY: And Roosevelt too, in my opinion.
A. UTKIN: This is Roosevelt, rather, this is the idea of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.
D. ZAKHAROV: Here. Into five parts, respectively, so that Germany, as a single state, ceases to exist at all as such.
V. DYMARSKY: And it’s not the zones of occupation, but specifically the five states.
A. UTKIN: And these states were even named. For example, in the south there was to be a union of Hungary, Austria and Bavaria. Prussia was to be completely destroyed.
D. ZAKHAROV: Which, in fact, is what happened.
A. Utkin: What, in fact, happened - East Prussia, which disappeared. Well, we can also say here about Stalin’s words, this is a difficult case when it is a joke to judge whether it is a joke or not, that it is necessary to select from 50 to 100 thousand Germans and shoot them, and here Churchill is indignant that we cannot do this. Well, to what extent he accepted this is difficult to judge, but the important thing is that Roosevelt said let's take 49 thousand.
V. DYMARSKY: Dima, you said just now that the foundations of the post-war redistribution were laid, not only the redistribution, but the post-war structure, because, in fact, then Roosevelt’s ideas were also discussed, and this is also one of the most important points of the Tehran Conference, this is the future United Nations. Roosevelt, of course, came with a flag and a scheme that, in general, had nothing in common with what happened, that is, these are about 10-11 large states, which, as it were, constitute a supervisory board for how they behave world, and very interestingly, even in name, the “police committee”, that is, in fact, the prototype of the Security Council, consisting of four states.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. Well, more frankly called simply.
V. DYMARSKY: Yes. USA, UK, Soviet Union and China. And, by the way, here in this regard we will answer the question that Alexander asked us from St. Petersburg: “When did France join the big three powers?”
V. DYMARSKY: Well, you see, Roosevelt added China to this big three in Tehran, and France was already annexed virtually at the very end of the war.
A. UTKIN: Let me answer. Winston Churchill fought for France like a lion. He understood that they had the same destiny. Many people did not like Charles de Gaulle, but they understood that if France went down, then the same would happen to all of Western Europe. And during the Yalta Conference, that is, years, two years had already passed, France was not invited to Yalta, and therefore, on the way back, de Gaulle, in a very bold manner, did not invite Franklin Delano Roosevelt to land in France.
V. DYMARSKY: Well, Roosevelt did not like de Gaulle, they say.
A. Utkin: They mutually did not like each other.
V. DYMARSKY: Roosevelt, in my opinion, wanted General Giraud.
A. Utkin: Yes, but Giraud turned out to be a bad politician, it was in North Africa, it was in December 1942, but de Gaulle completely won there and, moreover, he strengthened his position with a visit to Moscow in December 1944, when he The Franco-Soviet treaty was signed and it was clear that only de Gaulle as the leader of the French government could do this. I would like to say the following: as agreed at the Yalta Conference, France also received an occupation zone. She received an occupation zone even in West Berlin. If anyone has been to Berlin, then he knows that the French zone was in the north of Berlin. I had to be there. As for Germany itself, the German zone was, so to speak, cut out from the British and American zones of influence and, basically, when the French troops attacked, they stood next to the Americans, it was in the south, say, Stuttgart, these cities The French took it. But I would like to say something very important here. At the very moment when the leaders of the Big Three were meeting in Tehran, the Cold War began here. It has not yet manifested itself, it is still a ghost on the horizon. What's happened? When the great fascist council deprived Benito Mussolini of power and Field Marshal Badoglio returned to power, the question arose of how to govern Italy? And this was not agreed upon in detail, but, in principle, it was clear that there would be a military group consisting of an American, British and Soviet general. And so it happened. Stalin sent his general. And this is where you pay attention to what happens. It was September 1943 and Churchill was most afraid of this situation - he knew that there were two million communists in Italy, and if they contacted the Soviet embassy, then Italy would collapse for the West, it would, so to speak, disappear, it would be if not Soviet Union...
V. DYMARSKY: Is that why Churchill insisted on a southern direction of attack?
A. Utkin: Absolutely, yes. I just want to remind you the following. So, it means that the Soviet general was offered a villa with wine, with all kinds of entertainment in wartime and non-wartime, and this turned out to be a solution, but history is insidious: exactly a year later, namely on August 23, 1944, Soviet troops entered Bucharest and almost automatically the British and French they send their generals and Stalin sends them to the Carpathians to walk, relax, to villas and so on, that is, it happened here - it’s not for us to judge, by and large - but the Cold War arises, its germ is here: how to govern states that are liberated? Because Stalin later said: “I gave you France, Italy, Greece, why are you taking Hungary from me,” and so on. I think this is very significant.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, and here we must not forget about the Polish question, which was also discussed quite vigorously there.
V. DYMARSKY: Just like the British and the Soviet Union presented, as it were, two different “Curzon lines”, which were supposed to form the eastern border of Poland.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes, the Soviet version seemed to involve a more radical solution.
V. DYMARSKY: In general, many listeners ask, to some extent summing up, here is Mikhail, a lawyer: “Do you think the Allies had a chance not to give Poland to Stalin?”, and another one: “How did Stalin achieve the post-war boundaries at the conference? That is, in general, Stalin managed to impose his will on both Roosevelt and Churchill; he did not give up the Baltic states, which, in general, is known to have become part of the Soviet Union, nor did he give up the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus.
A. Utkin: Stalin had a trump card of phenomenal strength. Quite unexpectedly, on the first day of the conference - to be honest, as a historian, I would like to tell from the very beginning how Stalin and... Just imagine, even the details are important here. Stalin was 59 meters tall, large in the shoulders, with a large beautiful head, Roosevelt in a wheelchair was about the same height... In general, even this was significant. I want to quote Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, who, talking with the Polish government in exile in London, told them: “Well, okay, we will mobilize our forces, we will try, so to speak, to liberate Poland, the Red Army plus the British army. But can you imagine that the Russians will immediately put forward twice as powerful forces, that we cannot win here. We are creating for you a state where everything from the center to the border will be 500 kilometers. These are the best borders in Europe. You will get a huge piece of Germany."
V. DYMARSKY: Along the border along the Oder.
A. Utkin: But at the peak moment, at the moment when everything was being decided, when his eyes were shining, Stalin asked for a ten-minute break and with Molotov they brought out a mossy, old map, which at one time, in 1920, was sent to Moscow from the West , compiled, is the “Curzon Line,” the British Foreign Secretary at the time. And Stalin said words that were difficult to resist: “Do you think that we are less patriots than Lord Curzon? If he considered this border to be a national division, we agree to move 5-10 kilometers to the east, but we cannot categorically reject Curzon.” That was a powerful moment.
V. DYMARSKY: Sorry, just a small detail, because the British came with their map, where this “Curzon Line” and the border passed east of Lvov, Lviv fell into Poland, and along the Soviet “Curzon Line” the border moved to the west. And here is another question that was also discussed in Tehran, and Vladislav from Moscow asks us - however, he asks about the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, were they discussed at the conference - but the Turkish question was discussed in general, right?
A. Utkin: You know, I must say that if you collect everything that Churchill and Roosevelt, especially Churchill, said to Stalin about the Straits during the war, then it becomes completely incomprehensible what happened in the second half of the forties. But Churchill once said that Russia is a bear whose nostrils are blocked, which cannot breathe because it has no access to the open ocean. And it must be said that the British were already preparing a base in Cyprus. We must remember that in March 1915 Russia had already received the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but then everything changed in Moscow and in the West - mainly because everything changed in Moscow - but in this situation the first ice-free port was received, this is the port Dalny, Port Arthur actually. Russia has never had the importance of the port of Romanov, which today is our northern port of Murmansk, reached by the warm waves of the Gulf Stream, now it is a large port, but in earlier times it was a transfer station, through it it was only possible to communicate with the allies, this was one of the few good, talented ideas of Nicholas II - to create a railway with the help of German prisoners of war...
D. ZAKHAROV: To Murmansk.
A. UTKIN: ...between Moscow and Murmansk, and thereby make Murmansk a transfer point between the West and Russia. By the way, when we read now that the British are leaving Basra, where they stood for several years, we must remember that Basra was built for Lend-Lease. Lend-Lease - in order to speed up the transfer of all tankers, planes and Jeeps, the Americans built a railway through the whole of Tehran - and only then did they pick up Soviet ships and lift them up along the Volga. I must say that the Soviet Union has already received 5 thousand American aircraft to Tehran. They were very different from ours, even in appearance, they were made of mahogany. You know, anyone who sat on our plane - I think you had to - knows that everything there is made of iron, so that nothing would catch fire, God forbid. And here is a red tree. Hurricane, for example, was in mahogany. But most importantly, I want to say, and especially these days, this is an unpopular quote: it was in Tehran that Stalin said the words that...
V. DYMARSKY: Thanks to Roosevelt regarding Lend-Lease.
A. Utkin: Yes. ...which he never repeated. He said that the current war is a war of engines; The Americans produce 8-10 thousand aircraft per month, we produce 3 thousand aircraft, the British 3.5 thousand aircraft, this is a war of engines and we won it only because our great ally, the United States of America, helped us. This was said, and it is a sin, ingratitude, not to remember what was done in the most difficult time - 1942-43. Stalin's main trump card was participation in the war against Japan. Stalin suddenly stood up and said: “Three months after the end of the war in Europe, we will begin military operations in the Far East.” And Roosevelt specifically ordered all his employees not to mention the Far East, so as not to provoke Stalin, he wanted it to happen by itself. This was Stalin's strongest trump card. Roosevelt's strongest trump card was, of course - well, I'm not even talking about the Security Council - but the fact that a lot depended, because what did the two German divisions do if their telephone broke down? They sent a cavalryman from one unit to another, which was no longer the case even at the end of 1943 in the Soviet army. The Soviet army sat on wheels. Jeeps, Dodges, Jeeps, five-tons, Studebakers...
V. DYMARSKY: Cartridges, gunpowder.
A. Utkin: Yes. 14 million shapes...
V. DYMARSKY: Anatoly Ivanovich, I just want to take advantage, since we are talking about Lend-Lease, I want to take this opportunity and thank Alexey Serafimovich Ilyin from Balashikha, who simply sent an absolutely wonderful letter and a very interesting document from 1963 to the address of our program . This is a report to Khrushchev, they actually snitched on Zhukov, about the moods of Zhukov, the marshal. And Zhukov’s words are quoted in general on the history of the Great Patriotic War: “This is a varnished history, I believe that in this respect the writing of history, although also perverted, is still more honest than the German generals, they lie more truthfully.” And regarding Lend-Lease: “The Americans sent us so much material, without which we could not form our reserves, we could not continue the war, we did not have enough explosives, gunpowder, we did not have anything to equip rifle cartridges with, the Americans really helped out us with gunpowder and explosives." These are the words of Zhukov.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, not so much with gunpowder and explosives...
V. DYMARSKY: Well, in particular, apparently, for conversation. This is an overheard conversation.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. Gasoline, strategic materials, without which the production of many things was absolutely impossible.
A. Utkin: You know, the first time the two great powers clashed on this issue was when Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt’s best friend, came to the Kremlin in November 1941. And he asked: “What do you need?” A country that is in panic, that the enemy is approaching, that is great, patriotic and capable of fighting, it asks for one thing - machine guns. Stalin didn’t even mention the machine guns: “Aluminum.” And Hopkins rejoiced, he immediately ran to code a telegram to Roosevelt: “They will stand, they are asking for aluminum.” Aluminum can become airplanes in only six months. This means that then there was already faith that we would survive, and the Americans understood that Russia intended to survive at any cost.
V. DYMARSKY: Well, concluding our program today, let’s remember Tehran once again. Tehran allowed, as you said correctly, Anatoly Ivanovich, on the one hand, the allies to get closer, but on the other, this was also the beginning of further disengagement. Thank you.
D. ZAKHAROV: Thank you.
V. DYMARSKY: Our guest today was Anatoly Utkin, director of the Center for International Studies of the Institute of the USA and Canada, we talked about the Tehran Conference of 1943. The program was hosted by Dmitry Zakharov...
D. ZAKHAROV: And Vitaly Dymarsky. Goodbye.
